Friday, November 24, 2006

Road Pricing

The Seattle Times reports on an experiment in road pricing:

Tolls could cut congestion, test shows

For about eight months, drivers in 275 Seattle-area households agreed to pay for something the rest of us get for free: The right to drive on the region's freeways and streets.

They were guinea pigs in a pioneering study that explored how motorists' behavior might change if they had to pay tolls — not just on a few bridges or highways, but on almost every road with a yellow center line. Researchers established virtual tolls ranging from a nickel to 50 cents a mile. They gave participants pre-paid accounts of between $600 and $3,000, and told them they could keep whatever the tolls didn't eat up.

The experiment ended in February. Preliminary results, released this month, suggest that if such so-called "road pricing" were widespread, it could make a significant dent in traffic....

Participants in the Puget Sound Regional Council's "Traffic Choices" study had devices mounted on their dashboards in late 2004 and early 2005 that tracked their travel and transmitted the information to a central computer. Tolls, which varied by road and time of day, were deducted electronically from the pre-paid accounts, which were funded by the study's sponsors and sized to match how much participants had been driving before the study.

The promise of keeping some of that money proved to be a powerful incentive. Nearly 80 percent of the participants drove less than they did before, or they changed their routes or travel times to avoid the highest tolls, said Matthew Kitchen, the study's director. When the study was finished, the average payout was nearly $700 per household.

When other variables are factored out, Kitchen said, participants took 5 percent fewer auto trips and drove 2.5 percent fewer miles each weekday because of the tolls. The drop was even more dramatic during peak-traffic periods, when tolls were highest: 10 percent fewer trips and 4 percent fewer miles in the morning, 6 percent fewer trips and 11 percent fewer miles at night.

Note that road pricing can be viewed as a Pigovian tax on congestion externalities.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

How to Reduce Traffic Congestion

The price system, of course.  New evidence from Seattle:
New tolls on the Highway 520 bridge have reduced traffic so much that drivers are commonly traveling at 65 mph, maybe three times as fast as they're used to.

Thursday, December 26, 2019

My Whereabouts at ASSA

If blog readers would like to see me at the upcoming ASSA meetings in San Diego, you can find me at the following events:

Friday, Jan. 3, 2020 12:30 PM - 2:15 PM (PST)
Omicron Delta Epsilon John R. Commons Award Lecture

Manchester Grand Hyatt San Diego, America's Cup AB
Hosted By: Omicron Delta Epsilon
Chair: Stacey Jones, Seattle University

Panelist: N. Gregory Mankiw, Harvard University
Topic: The Past and Future of Econ 101

Saturday, Jan. 4, 2020 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (PST)
Is United States Deficit Policy Playing with Fire?

Marriott Marquis San Diego, Marriott Grand Ballroom 3
Hosted By: American Economic Association
Chair: Laurence Kotlikoff, Boston University

Public Debt, Low Interest Rates, and Rare Events
Richard Evans, University of Chicago

A Skeptic’s Guide to Modern Monetary Theory
N. Gregory Mankiw, Harvard University

How, Why and When Deficits and Debt Are Dangerous
Michael Boskin, Stanford University

Simulating the Blanchard-Summers Conjecture in a Multi-Period Life-Cycle Model
Jasmina Hasanhodzic, Babson College

Leveraging Posterity's Prosperity?
Johannes Brumm, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Laurence Kotlikoff, Boston University
Felix Kubler, University of Zurich

Discussant(s)
Alan Auerbach, University of California-Berkeley
Seth Benzell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Sunday, Jan. 5, 2020 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
Using Social Media and Blogging in Economic Education

Marriott Marquis San Diego, Marriott Grand Ballroom 11
Chair: Darshak Patel, University of Kentucky

Panelists:
Brandon Sheridan, Elon University
Jessica B. Hoel, Colorado College
N. Gregory Mankiw, Harvard University
Scott Cunningham, Baylor University
Martha L. Olney, University of California-Berkeley
Claudia Sahm, Federal Reserve Board

Cengage Booth
Because the 9th edition of my principles text has just been published, you can also find me at the Cengage booth at the book exhibition from 3 to 4 pm on Friday and 9 to 10 am on Saturday.

Monday, August 03, 2015

How Not to Pass a Carbon Tax

As long-time readers of this blog know, I have long advocated greater use of Pigovian taxes, such as taxes on carbon emissions. Such taxes can correct incentives by aligning private and social costs, and the revenue from such taxes can be used to reduce other, distortionary taxes.

Skeptics of Pigovian taxes on the right sometimes argue that such taxes are good in principle but in practice the left will co-opt them and, rather than using the revenue to reduce other taxes, will use it to fund ever larger government.

Sadly, that point of view is getting some support in Washington state.  The headline above from The Seattle Times reads 'Green' alliance opposes petition to tax carbon.  Why the opposition?  Because the ballot measure is revenue-neutral. Some environmentalists want to use the revenue from the proposed carbon tax to increase spending instead.

I believe that a carbon tax could someday win bipartisan support.  But before it does so, those on the left will need to convince those on the right that the tax would be a tax shift, not a tax increase.  The carbon tax needs to be evaluated on its own merits and should not be a stalking horse for a broader, big-government agenda.

Update: Responding to my post, John Whitehead writes, "The standard textbook treatment of a Pigouvian tax is agnostic on what happens to the revenue."

He is right, of course. So let me clarify. I was trying to make a point not about textbook economics but about practical politics.  Here are two propositions:

1. The tax system should be shifted in a Pigovian direction.
2. Government should be larger.

These are largely unrelated claims. Logically, one can believe both, neither, or only one of them.  In my view, it much easier to make the case to many voters, especially those on the right, for proposition 1 than for proposition 2.  As a result, if you strongly believe in proposition 1 and are trying to put together a coalition to make it happen, marrying it to proposition 2 is not the best move.